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The influence of personal proximity and framing on moral 
decision behaviour 
 
Alexander N. Bodansky & Erich H. Witte  
University of Hamburg 
 
 
It is a truism that the rationality of a decision can only be analyzed through its context 
and the reasons that the decider had. This approach broadens the concept of 
heuristics, which underlie human decision behavior. It is possible, at least for moral 
decisions, to deduce all relevant heuristics from basic philosophical ethical positions. 
This thought interloops the explanatory power from the two decision theories of 
Kahneman & Tverskys (2000) and Gigerenzer & Selten (2001) to a model of context 
dependent application of incommensurable principles. 
To proof this claim the classical Asian disease dilemma (ADP), used by Kahneman 
and Tversky in 1981 to show the framing effect, was varied by degrees of personal 
proximity. The ADP was understood as a dilemma with a moral context. The variation 
of personal proximity influenced the answer behavior and led to a disappearance of 
the framing effect at interindividual proximity. The main reasons accounted for 
answering the ADP were of utilitarian and deontological nature. With increasing 
proximity hedonistic reasons became more important while utilitarian reasons 
diminished. Different framings were accompanied by different importance of 
intuitionism.  
 
Keywords: personal proximity, framing effect, moral, decision processes, protected 
values, Asian disease dilemma 
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 Introduction 
Human decision processes are often evaluated through the gold standard of 
“rationality”. Unfortunately the term “rational” can be, and in fact often is, 
conceptualized in different ways. These different conceptualizations have led to a 
fragmentation of research on human decision processes, and are a vivid example 
of what Thomas Kuhn (1996) calls “incommensurability” between paradigms. Two 
prominent examples are 1) Kahneman and Tversky’s (2000) viewpoint, which 
declares that acting in accordance with the laws of frequency theory is rational 
decision behavior, and 2) Gigerenzer’s (1996) contraposition, which states that 
the very same action should be evaluated as irrational decision behavior. 
From Gigerenzer’s point of view, a person acting in accordance to the laws of 
frequency theory is wasting a lot of energy, because optimized decisions yield 
only a small return on investment, which does not justify the expense of time and 
effort. In Gigerenzer and Selten’s (2001, p.6.ff) approach, rationality is understood 
as “ecological rationality”, an ability for adaptation that evolved to cope with the 
demands of an ever-changing uncertain environment. 
While Kahneman (2000) interprets his research findings as counterevidence for 
rational decision models, mainly used in the context of economics, Gigerenzer 
and Selten’s work is more descriptive and focuses mainly on the application of 
cognitive heuristics in general everyday decision processes. Geissmaier and 
Gigerenzer (2006) claim that coping with the environment demands “fast and 
frugal”, decisions, which can only be made through intuitive reasoning, while 
Kahnemans and Tversky’s contraposition states that decisions are based on the 
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cognitive effort to maximize utility, which is delivered through mental calculation -
albeit often flawed- of utility outcomes.  
Indisputable, both paradigms do offer explanatory power for understanding and 
predicting human decision processes. But, we think that the conceptualization of 
“rational choice” is a rather philosophical question then a psychological one, and 
hence there cannot be a psychological answer to that question. More interesting 
for a psychologist are the evident contradictions between these two paradigms, 
which make it mandatory to think about the following two questions: 
1) Can a simple eclecticism of these influential theories, which combines both 
assumptions about the underlying mental processes into one unified 
explanation/theory of decision processes, be valid and even of greater 
explanatory power then both single theories alone? 
We do think so, because human decision processes take place in different 
contexts. We think that the context influences what kinds of mental processes are 
used, e.g. when we try to catch a ball we probably rely to a great degree on our 
intuition, while if we buy stocks we let our decisions pretty much be guided 
through mental calculations, which try to predict the future outcome of our 
investment. Already more than 30 years ago, Eiser and Bhavnani (1974), using 
the prisoner dilemma game, proved that the description of content influences the 
decision behavior of subjects. They showed that people use this information in 
their gaming strategies. More recently, Druckman (2001) made a similar claim, 
stating that the rationality of decision behavior and the application of mental 
processes are always context dependent. Hence, different contexts allow people 
to use different mental processes to decide, and an eclectic combination of both 
theories in relation to the field in which a decision takes place can be sound. 
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2) If it is not contradictory to claim that decision processes can be based on these 
two different kinds of mental processes, then are these the only two mental 
processes that are relevant for human decision behavior? Or in other words: Can 
utility maximizing cognitions, as supported by Kahneman and Tversky, or intuitive 
heuristics as advocated by Gigerenzer, explain decision processes sufficiently?  
Every context, in which decisions take place, is a unique combination of demands 
and needs towards the decider. E.g. political, economic, moral or social contexts 
do influence how we think about a problem and how we decide. Hence, taking a 
look at context specific mental processes could yield that there are distinguishable 
mental processes, which cannot be subordinated under intuition or utility 
calculation. We think that intuition and utility calculation are at best necessary, but 
definitely not sufficient, to explain human decision processes. 
To test our assumptions we used a prominent finding from Tversky and 
Kahneman as a showcase. In 1981 they had found that the formulation of an 
outcome influences decision behavior. They had confronted subjects with a 
dilemma that had two mathematically equivalent options, which differed only in the 
way they were stated. One option was stated in exact numbers, while the other 
one was stated in probabilities. If the two options were formulated in terms of 
gains (positive framing), then subjects tended to favor the option with the exact 
number. If the two options were formulated in terms of losses (negative framing), 
then the majority of subjects chose the option stated in probabilities. Kahneman 
and Tversky called this preference shift the “framing effect”. The most striking 
example of the framing effect was in subjects` decision behavior on the Asian 
disease problem (henceforth referred to as ADP), developed by Tversky and 
Kahneman in 1981. The unwanted consequence of the ADP is the possible death 
of 600 strangers resulting from a rare disease. The subjects have to choose 
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between two medical treatment programs to save the strangers. (See Appendix A 
for the full Asian disease problem text.)  
To explain the framing effect, Kahneman and Tversky used the assumption that a 
change of reference point alters the preference order for prospects. The prospect 
theory implies that a negative translation of a choice problem increases risk 
seeking behavior in some situation. They claim that decision behavior is 
sufficiently explained through these assumed prospects and the psychological 
impact they evoke. The reader is referred to the original text from Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) for a more detailed description and graphic representation of 
this account.  
Contrary to Kahneman and Tversky we assume that it is relevant that the ADP 
can be interpreted as a moral dilemma – takes place within a moral context. The 
task of the ADP is to save as many fellow humans as you can. The lives of 600 
strangers depend on the decider and the decision is most likely accompanied by 
feelings of guilt towards those who could not be saved, as well as other moral 
feelings and considerations. Maule (1989) showed through verbal protocols of 
subjects who were confronted with the ADP, that cognitions appear, which can be 
classified as moral, especially under negative framing. Hence, if moral cognitions 
are present while deciding on the ADP then leaving them out of the “explanans” 
(Hempel, 1965) of an explanation must be an invalid oversimplification, which 
does not consider the degree of complexity the decisions entails. 
We think that these moral feelings and considerations do at least influence human 
decision processes, maybe even determine them completely.  
In their research Tanner, Medin and Iliev (2008) have found some evidence that 
moral cognitions interfere with the framing effect. They demonstrated that people 
who had a deontological orientation were immune to framing effects.  
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Witte and Doll (1995) have empirically distinguished four main ethical positions, 
which subjects rely on for moral decision behavior. Those four positions include 
utilitarianism, deontology, intuitionism, and hedonism. The reader is referred to 
the original text from Witte and Doll (1995, see also Gollan & Witte, in press; 
Halverscheid & Witte,2008) for a more detailed description of the four ethical 
positions. Each of these four positions proposes a different kind of rationality, 
which is incommensurable with the others. The meaning of these value attitudes 
has been similarly found by —among others— Barnett, Bass, Brown and Hebert 
(1998) as well as Forsyth (1992).  
We assume that the intuitive heuristics described by Gigerenzer and the utility 
maximizing cognitions discussed in the work of Kahneman and Tversky are 
resembled within the theoretical framework of Witte and Doll through the ethical 
positions of intuitionism and utilitarianism, while Tanner et al.´s finding is 
resembled through deontology.  
Understanding the context of the ADP allows testing the assumption from 
Kahneman and Tversky that decision behavior is based exclusively on utility 
maximization. They claimed that the presentation of a dilemma in terms of positive 
or negative outcomes evokes flawed utility calculations by the participants. We 
claim that the context of morality has to be included when decision behavior at the 
ADP ought to be explained and that utility calculations are not sufficient when 
explaining decision processes and behavior (see also Wang, 1996a, 1996b).  
Through changes in the moral intensity of the dilemma the basic utilities of the 
ADP can be left untouched, while only a dimension within the context of morality 
is varied. Moral intensity is such a dimension and a complex psychological 
construct, which is composed out of many different parameters. Such a parameter 
is e.g. “personal proximity”. Jones (1991) remarked: “Intuitively, people tend to 
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become much more concerned about moral issues that affect those who are close 
to them rather than those with whom they have little or no contact.”(see also 
Wang, Simons & Bredart, 2001).  Witte and Doll (1995) propose that it is possible 
to classify personal proximity through the persons affected by a decision. 
Decisions that affect a group of people or the community can be classified as 
“social”. Decisions that affect just one person other than the decider him-/herself 
can be classified as “interindividual”, while decisions that affect the deciding 
person him-/herself can be classified as “intraindividual”. Hence, using this 
classification scheme allows for changes in the personal proximity of the ADP, 
without altering its basic task conditions or utilities. Differences in decision 
behavior due to altered personal proximity can be seen as a proof that utility 
maximizing cognitions cannot by themselves account for decision behavior 
sufficiently. 
For other contexts the influence of the context has already been proven. E.g. in 
the political context, Druckman (2001) found that people base their preferences 
on systematic information rather than on arbitrary information contained in the 
frames. Druckman quotes Bless, Betsch and Franzen (1998), who showed that 
when subjects were told that the ADP is a “medical research” problem, the 
framing effect was normal. However, no framing effect was found when subjects 
were told that the ADP was a “statistical research” problem. Furthermore, Wang et 
al. (2001) demonstrated a group-size-effect, a kinship-effect, a culture-effect and 
a gender-effect. 
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Hypotheses 
On the ground of our claims we formulated the following hypotheses:  
H1 : Intuition and mental utility calculations are not sufficient to explain decision 
behavior, especially not for moral problems. 
H2 : The ADP is perceived as a dilemma with moral impact, i.e., it is a moral 
problem.  
H3 : Subjects that decide on the ADP rely on all four ethical positions 
(utilitarianism, intuitionism, deontology and hedonism) to arrive at a decision.  
H4 : Subjects choosing the option stated in probabilities rely on different ethical 
positions than those subjects who pick the exact outcome option. Decision 
behavior is related to the importance the four ethical positions have for the 
deciding subject. 
H5 : The personal proximity of each ADP scenario influences the extent to which 
subjects rely on the four ethical positions. 
H6 : The framing of the ADP influences the extent to which subjects rely on the 
four ethical positions.   
As a possible confounding variable the moral competence of each participant was 
measured with the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) described by Lind and Wakenhut 
(1980).  
 
Experiment 
The experiment was partially based on a between-subject design. During the 
experiment subjects had to decide on three versions of the ADP out of six (3 x 
personal proximity and 2x framing), which differed in their personal proximity. This 
was done by including a) the best friend and b) oneself, into the group of c) 600 
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strangers that are infected by the disease in the ADP. Thus one version was left in 
the original terms of the ADP as a control condition of the survey sample. The 
German translation from Stocke (1998) was used. 
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) claim that there is a need for researchers to 
develop and incorporate valid measures of emotional intensity when framing 
effects are studied. Accordingly, the perceived moral intensity of the three ADP 
versions was measured through a seven-step Likert item; “How “moral” did you 
think this problem was?” This item was also intended to work as a validity check 
to test if the assumed moral context was appropriate for all three versions of the 
ADP.  
To measure if, and to what extent, subjects relied on the empirically distinguished 
four ethical principles, an instrument from Witte and Doll (1995) was used. The 
instrument asked: “Which aspects were important for your decision? Please mark 
the importance of the different aspects”, and consisted out of 20 five-step Likert 
items. The instrument was applied after each version of the ADP was presented, 
i.e. three times per subject.  
As a possible confounding variable the moral competence of each participant was 
measured with the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) from Lind and Wakenhut (1980). 
The MJT resulted in an average C-Score, which was a good and reliable 
estimation of the subjects’ moral competence. This instrument consists of two 
sheets. Each of the sheets was presented between two versions of the ADP, 
serving as a diversion between the three ADP versions.  
The ADP has been repeatedly used in psychological research. Since it was 
foreseeable that at least a few psychology students would be familiar with the 
ADP, or with the concept of the framing effect, those subjects were excluded 
before the hypotheses were tested. Subjects who claimed that they did not take 
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the questioning seriously were also excluded a priori, by rating on the lower end 
(one or two) on a seven point Likert item: “How seriously did you take this 
questioning?” A final manipulation check excluded those subjects who failed to 
notice the change in personal proximity and those who were unable to name the 
differences in personal proximity between the three versions of the ADP.  
The survey concluded by asking for the following sociological variables: sex, age, 
education level, nationality, and active practice of a religion, if any.  
The sample size was a priori stated with n=144. Kühberger (1998) had found in a 
meta- analysis that the average effect size of reported framing effects was a 
weighted d=0.308. Knowing the expected effect size made it possible to 
determine a priori the optimal sample size. 144 subjects gave a suitable high test-
power (0.95) for a chi² test in order to find a medium sized effect (w=0.30), with 
one degree of freedom (df=1) and a significance criterion of p= 0.05.  
The data collection was done through the on-line software “Unipark”, and was 
conducted until the stated sample size was reached. This was done from March 
26t until May 13t, 2007. In order to obtain 144 subjects who gave valid answers, 
179 subjects had to fill in the questionnaire. Of this total, 35 subjects were 
excluded before statistical testing, because they had failed in the previously 
mentioned manipulation checks.  
The subjects in the final sample were 79 females and 65 males, with an average 
age of 26.29 years. Of the total number of participants, 122 subjects were 
German citizens with German parents, 16 had at least one or both parents of 
another nationality, and 6 were not German nor were their parents. One hundred 
and twenty-one subjects stated that they did not practice any religion, 23 said that 
they did, varying along all major religions. The subjects were predominantly 
psychology students who received credits for participation; other students 
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participated because they were offered the chance of winning one of two 
vouchers of 20€ or 15€ good for purchases at an online bookstore. Using students 
as subjects is a valid research procedure, as Kühberger (1998) did not found any 
difference in the effect size of framing effects between student and target 
population samples in his meta-analysis. 
The average time for answering the survey was about 23 minutes; the minimum 
requirement of ten minutes ensured that the results were not due to just randomly 
“clicking”. 
 
Results 
The influence of sociological variables was always tested upfront. To create a 
short-cut terminology the three versions of the ADP were named after their 
personal proximity: Asian-strangers, Asian-friend and Asian-self. The answer 
option of the ADP that is stated in probabilities was called “risky”, while the option 
that stated in exact numbers was called “sure”. The term “significant” always 
referred to the standard p<0.05 criterion.  
The perceived moral intensity of the three versions of the ADP was always above 
the mid-point of the scale (Asian-strangers=4.39; Asian-friend=4.51; Asian-
self=4.16). Thus, the ADP can be interpreted as a moral decision. This data 
supports H2. 
The moral intensity of the three dilemmas was compared through an ANOVA with 
repeated measuring. It showed a significant difference (F=3.951; Greenhouse-
Geisser p=0.021; df=2; eta²=0.027). Post-hoc T-tests showed that the significant 
difference in moral intensity was due to the difference between Asian-friend and 
Asian-self.  
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In all three ADPs subjects tended to favor the “risky” decision above the sure one 
(Asian-strangers: “risky”~68%, “sure”~32%; Asian-friend: “risky”~70,8%, 
“sure”~29,2%; Asian-self: “risky”~74,3%, “sure”~25,7%). Hence, over all three 
versions the 50 to 50 ratio that Tversky and Kahneman (1981) expect from 
rational deciders is violated, but not in the same way, as predicted through their 
prospect theory. 
At Asian-strangers 52.1% of subjects under the positive framing and 84.5% under 
the negative framing chose the “risky” option (χ²=17.44; p=0.000; df=1), thereby 
replicating the original finding from 1981. At Asian-self 64.4% of subjects chose 
the “risky” option under the positive framing and 84.5% did the same under the 
negative framing (χ²=7.63; p= 0.000; df=1). Therefore, the framing effect had a 
bigger effect size at Asian-strangers, compared to Asian-self.  
At Asian-friend the majority of subjects made the “risky” decision under positive 
framing (74.6%), as did the majority under negative framing (67.1%) (χ²=0.99; 
p=0.321; df=1). Hence, the divergent moral intensity of the Asian-friend was 
consistent with the absence of a framing effect (see Table 1).  
Table 1 Decision behavior  
Positive Framing Negative Framing 
Risky Sure Risky Sure Dilemma 
n % n % n % n % 
χ² p 
Asian-
strange 
38 52.1 35 47.9 60 84.5 11 15.5 17.44 0.000
Asian-
friend 
53 74.6 18 25.4 49 67.1 24 32.9 0.99 0.321
Asian- 
self 
47 64.4 26 35.6 60 84.5 11 15.5 7.63 0.000
 
 12
 The instrument from Witte and Doll (1995), which measured the appliance of the 
four ethical positions at each dilemma, showed good reliability indicators. The 
average Cronbach’s alpha for all scales was α=0,784, with a minimum of α=0.680 
for the deontology scale at Asian-strangers, and a maximum of α=0.865 for the 
hedonism scale at Asian-friend. In order to achieve a higher Cronbach’s alpha for 
the utilitarianism scale as applied to Asian-self and Asian-strangers one item was 
excluded: “The largest benefit for the most people is in my opinion the principle 
which has to be used to evaluate actions.” However, the other four items are also 
prototypical for the consequentiality position so that utilitarianism is the core 
concept of the scale.  
A broad overview of the appliance of the four positions showed that Utilitarianism 
was rated as the most important position on which subjects relied for their 
decision (Asian-strangers: M=4.06, s=0.63; Asian-friend: M=3.99, s=0.71; Asian-
self: M=3.98, s=0.71), followed by deontology (Asian-strangers: M=3.15, s=0.76; 
Asian-friend: M=3.07, s=0.81; Asian-self: M=3.16, s=0.77) and interchanging 
intuitionism- (Asian-strangers: M=2.70, s=0.89; Asian-friend: M=2.60, s=0.89; 
Asian-self: M=2.74, s=0.81) and hedonism (Asian-strangers: M=2.58, s=0.80; 
Asian-friend: M=2.66, s=0.87; Asian-self: M=2.92, s=0.82). This data supports H3 
if a mean greater than 2.00 is interpreted as some importance for the decision. 
Because almost all ethical position scales did not pass the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-
test, the hypotheses of Gaussian variables had to be rejected. Therefore 
nonparametric procedures were used for interferential hypothesis testing. 
To test the influence of personal proximity on the appliance of the four ethical 
positions, Friedman tests were conducted, using the three dilemmas (strangers 
vs. friend vs. self) as independent variable. There were significant differences 
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between the three dilemmas for hedonism (Asian-strangers MR=1.77; Asian-
friend MR=1.87; Asian-self MR=2.37; χ²=33.3, p=0.000; df=2). Post-hoc 
conducted Wilcoxon-tests showed that the significance was due to the difference 
between Asian-self on the one and the other two dilemmas on the opposite side. 
This was expected and was interpreted as a validation of the manipulated 
description of the ADP and as a corroboration of H5  
Intuitionism also varied significantly in its role among the three problems (Asian-
strangers MR=2.01; Asian-friend MR=1.84; Asian-self MR=2.15; χ²=7.37, 
p=0.025; df=2). Post–hoc Wilcoxon-tests showed that the significant difference 
was due to Asian-friend on the one and the other two dilemmas on the opposite 
side. This constitutes validation of the different moral intensity levels found above. 
H5 is supported by these findings.  
Utilitarianism missed the significance criterion only narrowly, but a steady trend 
was visible with decreasing reliance on utilitarianism as the personal proximity 
increased. (Asian-strangers MR=2.14; Asian-friend MR=1.96; Asian-self 
MR=1.89; χ²=5.90, p=0.052; df=2).  
There was no difference between the ADPs under the deontological perspective. 
All three ADPs required ethical decisions based on rules, values, and norms. 
They are moral problems based on deontological considerations. 
To test if differences in the overall decision behavior were matched by differences 
in the application of the four ethical positions Mann-Whitney-U-tests were 
conducted for every scale with every dilemma using decision behavior (“risky” vs. 
“sure”) as an independent variable. The tests showed that decision behavior 
interacted significantly with utilitarianism and deontology at Asian-friend. Subjects 
that chose the “risky” option relied significantly more on these two ethical positions 
than did those who selected the “sure” choice (Utilitarianism: sure n=42; 
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MR=60.49; risky n=100; MR=76.13; Z=-2.077; p=0.038; Deontology: sure n= 42; 
MR=56.43; risky n=100; MR=77.83; Z=-2.842; p=0.004). Therefore, risky deciders 
based their decision at this most moral decision more intensively on the two 
ethical positions, which use universal perspectives (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Appliance of ethical positions at Asian-friend in dependence of decision behavior 
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 *    * 
   *  * 
*= Significant difference on the P<0,05 Level 
 
The influence of the two framings on the reliance on the four ethical positions was 
also tested with Mann-Whitney-U-tests, using the framing as an independent 
variable. These tests revealed significant results for intuitionism. Subjects relied 
on intuitionism to a significantly greater degree at Asian-strangers and Asian-self 
under the positive framing than they did under negative framing, while it was vice 
versa, but on a lower level, for Asian-friend (Asian-strangers; positive MR=78.97; 
negative MR=63.60; Z=-2.11; p=0.026; df=1 / Asian-self; positive MR=79.71; 
negative MR=65.08; Z=-2.11; p=0.035; df=1 / Asian-friend; positive MR=62.96; 
negative MR=79.59; Z=-2.412; p=0.016; df=1). Hence, the two ADPs with lesser 
moral implication (Asian-strangers and Asian-self), which both showed a framing 
effect, evoked a different application of intuitionism compared to the ADP with the  
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highest moral implication, which showed no framing effect (Asian-friend) (see 
Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Appliance of intuitionism under different framings at different personal proximity 
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To test if these predictors were also valid for the decision behavior at each 
individual level of personal proximity, further binary logistic regressions were 
conducted, all of them using the Likelihood Quotient as a criterion for relevant 
predictors.  
At Asian-strangers the stepwise forward procedure, using the same variables as 
before, revealed that only framing (Wald =15.198) could be used as a predictor, 
with a Nagelkerkes-R² of 0.164 and 65.9% correctly predicted decisions. The 
stepwise-backward procedure revealed a combination of framing (Wald =16.365), 
gender (Wald =3.858) and moral competence (Wald =2.973) as valid predictors, 
with a higher Nagelkerkes-R² of 0.222 and 72.6% of decisions predicted correctly. 
Obviously, framing was the most relevant predictor at this personal proximity 
level. 
At Asian-friend, which was the dilemma without the framing effect, the stepwise 
forward procedure revealed that application of deontology (Wald = 6.223) was the 
best predictor, with a Nagelkerkes-R² of 0.068 and 68.7% correctly predicted 
decisions. The stepwise-backward procedure found two predictors, deontology 
(Wald= 7.157) and moral competence (Wald = 3.341); this model had a 
Nagelkerkes-R² of =0.103 and 68.7% of decisions predicted correctly. Decision 
behavior at this personal proximity is best explained by individual variables 
differentiating the ethical interpretation of the problem.   
At Asian-self the stepwise-forward procedure showed a single predictor as 
solution: framing (Wald = 6.648), with a Nagelkerkes-R² of 0.074 and 72.6.7% of 
decisions predicted correctly. The stepwise-backward procedure found four –two 
individual and two contextual- predictors, respectively, intuitionism (Wald =2.94) 
and moral competence (Wald =2.776), and framing (Wald =8.637) and gender 
(Wald=2.816). This model had a Nagelkerkes-R² of 0.152 and 73.3% of decisions 
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predicted correctly. Decision behavior at this personal proximity is therefore best 
explained by the context variable of framing.  
 
Discussion 
The subjects rated all three versions of the ADP over the midpoint of the moral 
intensity item. The data supports the H2. This indicates that it is correct to assume 
that answers on the ADP have to be evaluated in the context of morality. The 
rating is in line with the face validity of the moral context and suggests further that 
it is reasonable for subjects to use the four ethical positions as a basis for their 
decision. 
Decision behavior changed due to the manipulation of personal proximity. This 
can be interpreted in favor of H1. The change in decision behavior cannot be 
explained through the utilities of the task and therefore utility calculation cannot 
explain sufficiently how subjects decide on the ADP, because the subjectively 
expected utilities were constant over all decision dilemmas. 
And in deed not only the utilitarian calculus, also the other three ethical positions 
were constantly applied at all three versions of the ADP, as stated in H3. The 
most important ethical positions were the utilitarian and the deontological one. 
Hedonistic and intuitionist ethical positions were found to be not as important for 
the deciders.  
H4 asserted coherence between decision behavior and application of the ethical 
positions. This coherence was only found in the ADP with interindividual proximity, 
where “sure” deciders relied overall more on utilitarianism and deontology than did 
those who had decided on the “risky” choice. 
With an increased —hence closer— personal proximity, the ethical position of 
hedonism was more frequently applied. The more personal proximity decreased, 
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the greater was the tendency to rely on utilitarianism. These findings support H5 
and the conclusion that personal proximity does influence the extent to which 
people rely on each ethical position for their decision. This leads to the 
assumption that subjects seem to decide inconsistently, which means that they 
use a double standard for their decisions depending on context and domain. 
H6 predicted that framing influences the application of the four ethical positions, 
but not in which way. The framing of the ADP evoked a different application of 
intuitionism in regard of the personal proximity. 
The data support in its tendency the conclusion that it is the application of 
intuitionism that leads subjects to choose more likely the “sure” option under 
positive framing at social and intraindividual personal proximity (Asian-strangers 
and Asian-self) and under negative framing at interindividual proximity (Asian-
friend). This tendency supports Gigerenzer`s idea of intuitive decision behavior in 
the classical decision problem (Asian-strangers). Since intuitionism covariates 
significantly with the interaction between the framing and the decision quality 
(risky-sure) this kind of “heuristic” is relevant for the classical framing effect in 
general. Intuitive thinking has an influence (Gigerenzer, 2008). 
But, does it explain why the dilemma with the interindividual personal proximity 
showed no framing effect? Contrary to the predictions of prospect theory there is 
a higher percentage of “risky” answers under the positive framing and no 
difference between the two framing conditions, because under negative framing 
the percentage of the “sure” decisions also increased – both compared to the 
other two dilemmas. There is an increase of the risky decisions under positive 
framing and an increase of sure decisions under the negative framing. 
This varied distribution can be explained as a product of multiple effects, which 
can be explained through different application of the four ethical positions (see 
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Table 2). It seems that the following three effects interacted and eliminated the 
framing effect on the surface of Asian-friend: 
1. The higher percentage of “risky” decision behavior, regardless what framing 
was present, was associated with a higher reliance on deontological and utilitarian 
reasoning. Due to this general effect there is compared to the other two dilemmas 
also an increase of the risky decisions under positive framing.  
2. The significantly higher application of intuitionism under negative framing led to 
a higher percentage of “sure” decisions. 
3. These two effects combined – increase of risky decisions under positive 
framing and increase of sure decisions under negative framing – eliminates the 
general framing effect. 
 
Moreover, if the average reliance on the four ethical positions influences decision 
behavior, and is therefore also responsible for the appearance and disappearance 
of the framing effect, then to proceed backwards from the framing effect itself to 
invariant principles that guide human decision behavior, is in risk to succumbing to 
the logical mistake of “affirming the consequent”. Kahneman and Tversky (2000) 
interpreted the framing effect as a violation of the invariance principle of rational 
choice, as the utilities of both decisions of the ADP are mathematically the same 
and “rational” humans should decide in a 50:50 ratio between “sure” and “risky” 
choices. At interindividual personal proximity there is the same violation of the 
invariance principle, with about 70% of subjects choosing the “risky” option, as 
with the other two personal proximity versions, but this time without the 
appearance of the framing effect. There is also a lack of explanation by 
Kahneman and Tverskys theory, why the observed distribution deviates from the 
50:50 ratio with a higher preference of risky decisions? The rationality of decision 
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behavior cannot be sufficiently determined alone through the existence or non-
existence of a framing effect. Our speculation is that this general deviation is 
caused by the interpretation of all these dilemmas as moral, and the subsequent 
usage of moral heuristics. 
We conclude that variant considerations, which are dependent on the context of 
the decision, like the application of different ethical positions, guide and constitute 
decision behavior. To define, explain and understand these underlying processes, 
data about the underlying processes have to be collected, not only about the 
decision behavior itself, regardless of how consistent or inconsistent it is in terms 
of the invariance principle.  
In this proposal we broadened the content of heuristics applied to decide at the 
ADP. We checked to what extend different heuristics, which are deduced from 
different incommensurable ethical positions, were used for decision behavior. 
Further research can use this experimental data to determine the precise 
influence each kind of heuristic has on decision behavior.  
Our experimental data supports Gigerenzer`s claim that intuition plays a vital part 
in human decision behavior and is responsible for parts of the framing effect. At 
the same time, the same data can be also read, at least partially, in favor of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s explanation and their claim that decision behavior is 
based on utility maximizing cognitions, as subjects stated that the position of 
utilitarianism was the most important basis for their decision. Summarizing, both 
theoretical approaches are supported by the experimental data. But, as stated in 
H1, neither one is sufficient to explain decision behavior. They both lack 
integration of applied rationalities such as deontology and hedonism. Both 
theories offer explanations for the occurrence of framing effects, but cannot 
 21
explain why a simple manipulation of personal proximity leads to an anomalous 
(not preference-shifted) decision behavior. 
The effects of context and the application of context-specific rationality 
conceptualizations, shown in this paper for the moral context, must be explored if 
decision behavior is to be truly understood. Further research and theoretical 
approaches that explain decision behavior should therefore always try to integrate 
the influence of relevant context and test what kind of incommensurable 
rationalities, or call them heuristics, people rely on, when they decide (Wang, 
1996a). 
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 Appendix A: 
From Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000): 
“Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have 
been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of 
the program are the follows: 
  
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  
If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.  
 
Which of the two programs would you favour?  (…) 
 
If program C is adopted, 400 people will die.  
If program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two 
third probability that 600 people will die.  
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Appendix B: Questionnaire (German) to determine subjects’ 
reliance on the four ethical positions 
 
 
Welche Aspekte waren bei Ihrer Entscheidung bedeutsam? Kreuzen Sie die 
Wichtigkeit der einzelnen Aspekte an.  
 
1  
nicht  
bedeutsam  
2  
wenig  
bedeutsam 
3  
mittelmäßig 
bedeutsam 
4  
ziemlich  
bedeutsam  
5  
sehr  
bedeutsam 
 
1.  Ich achte darauf, wie es mir persönlich dabei ergeht.  1 2 3 4 5  
2.  Ich weiß einfach, dass meine Handlung richtig ist.  1 2 3 4 5  
3.  Diese Handlung bringt nach meiner Meinung für alle einen 
großen Nutzen (Schaden).  
1 2 3 4 5  
4.  Es gibt nach meiner Meinung klare Regeln, wie man sich zu 
verhalten hat. Diese müssen bei Beurteilungen dieser 
Handlung herangezogen werden.  
1 2 3 4 5  
5.  Ich muss mit meinen Handlungen zufrieden sein.  1 2 3 4 5  
6.  Ich bin mir sicher, dass diese Handlung angemessen ist.  1 2 3 4 5  
7.  Die positiven (negativen) Folgen für alle sind nach meiner 
Meinung bei dieser Handlung groß.  
1 2 3 4 5  
8.  Nach meiner Meinung gibt es zur Wahl von Verhaltensweisen 
soziale Verpflichtungen, die für die Handlungen wichtig sind  
1 2 3 4 5  
9.  Ich muss tun, was für mich persönlich Vorteile bringt.  1 2 3 4 5  
10.  Man kann nicht jede Handlung begründen.  1 2 3 4 5  
11.  Ich achte darauf, wie die anderen über mich denken.  1 2 3 4 5  
12.  Man muss nach meiner Meinung die Konsequenz dieser 
Handlung für alle betrachten.  
1 2 3 4 5  
13.  Soziale Normen sind nach meiner Meinung für diese 
Handlung die angemessene Beurteilung.  
1 2 3 4 5  
14.  Die Handlung muss zu meinem eigenen Wohlbefinden 
beitragen.  
1 2 3 4 5  
15.  Ich musste einfach so handeln.  1 2 3 4 5  
16.  Es zählt nach meiner Meinung letztlich, was für alle dabei 
herauskommt.  
1 2 3 4 5  
17.  Nach meiner Meinung sind allgemeingültige Werte für mein 
Handeln entscheidend gewesen.  
1 2 3 4 5  
18.  Ich muss mit mir zufrieden sein.  1 2 3 4 5  
19.  Für mich war diese Handlung sofort überzeugend.  1 2 3 4 5  
20.  Der größte Vorteil für die meisten ist nach meiner Meinung 
das Prinzip, nach dem man die Handlung beurteilen muss.  
1 2 3 4 5  
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Appendix C: Questionnaire (literary English translation) to 
determine subjects’ reliance on the four ethical positions 
 
Which aspects were influential for your decision? Mark the importance of the 
individual aspects.  
 
1  
Not 
important  
2  
A bit  
important 
3  
Mediocre  
important 
4  
Very   
important
5  
Extremely  
Important  
 
1.  I pay attention to how I personally feel. 1 2 3 4 5  
2.  I just know that my action is right. 1 2 3 4 5  
3.  In my opinion, this action presents a great benefit (harm) for 
all. 
1 2 3 4 5  
4.  In my opinion, there are strict rules, which determine how 
everybody has to act. These rules have to be taken into 
account when this action is evaluated.  
1 2 3 4 5  
5.  I have to be pleased with my actions.  1 2 3 4 5  
6.  I am sure, this action is appropriate.  1 2 3 4 5  
7.  In my opinion, the positive (negative) consequences of this 
action for all are huge.  
1 2 3 4 5  
8.  In my opinion, there are social obligations for choosing how to 
act, which are important for this action.  
1 2 3 4 5  
9.  I have to do what presents the largest benefits for me.  1 2 3 4 5  
10.  Not every action can be justified.  1 2 3 4 5  
11.  I take care, how other people think about me.  1 2 3 4 5  
12.  In my opinion, the consequences of an action for all have to 
be considered.  
1 2 3 4 5  
13.  In my opinion, social norms present a suitable setting for 
evaluating this action.  
1 2 3 4 5  
14.  The action has to add to my own well-being.  1 2 3 4 5  
15.  I just had to act like that.  1 2 3 4 5  
16.  In my opinion, everybody’s outcome is everything that 
matters.  
1 2 3 4 5  
17.  In my opinion, universal values were the fundamentals for my 
action.  
1 2 3 4 5  
18.  I have to be satisfied with myself.  1 2 3 4 5  
19.  This action was instantly convincing for me.  1 2 3 4 5  
20.  In my opinion, the largest benefit for all is the principle under 
which actions have to be evaluated.  
1 2 3 4 5  
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Appendix D: Short description of the four ethical positions 
This short description of the four ethical positions is taken from Witte, Heitkamp & 
Wolfram (2005).  
 
 
Hedonism:  
Hedonism goes back to Aristippos and contains that an action has to be 
performed when it brings pleasure to oneself. This could be intermingled with 
egoism but it does not have to be. To put it more neutral, the action performed 
should not be in opposition to the individual human dignity (Witte & Doll, 1995).  
 
Intuitionism: 
Intuitionism considers the reason for an action to stem from individual insight or 
individual feeling regarding it as self-evident. Intuitionism prevents justifications 
from running to a dead end, to an endless regress (Rawls, 1971; Witte & Doll, 
1995). 
 
Utilitarianism: 
Utilitarianism prescribes to perform that action which brings the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number (of feeling beings). It is associated with the 
names of J. Bentham and J. S. Mill.  
 
Deontology: 
In contrast to utilitarianism, from a deontological point of view the end does not 
justify the means, but the means themselves underlie the need of justification. 
According to deontology, justifications should match universal principles such as 
the categorical imperative, formulated by Immanuel Kant.  
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